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STUDIA MATHEMATICA
BULGARICA
ASSESSMENT OF INFORMATION ASYMMETRY
D. Christozov, P. Mateev 1
In the process of trading, the seller and buyer participate with different
initial knowledge about the technical capabilities and about the expected
use of the good. This two-side asymmetry affects the success of the nego-
tiation in e-trading. This paper discusses one practical approach to assess
information asymmetry and the role of warranty in seller-buyer communi-
cation relationship. The presented approach is illustrated with a survey
experiment.
1. Introduction
Success of a business deal, involves the two parties – seller and buyer, depends
on variety of factors. They may be divided in two major groups:
• Environmental factors: properties of environment in which the seller-
buyer relationship operates, such as IT infrastructure, Logistic Infrastruc-
ture, Financial Infrastructure, and Government regulations.
• Communicational factors: properties of interpersonal relationship be-
tween two parties. Such as efficiency and effectiveness of communication
process, trust and confidence; content and acceptance of the exchanged
messages; etc.
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In general, there no exist error-less communication channel. So the Informa-
tion Asymmetry is a natural property of any communication process. Information
asymmetry often results in misunderstanding and eroded the trust between sell-
ers and buyers. From customers’ point of view, missing of adequate knowledge
about the product may result in wrong purchase decision. From point of view
of the seller wrong customer’s understanding about the properties of the prod-
ucts results in customers’ dissatisfaction and loss of market positions. Often, the
customer doesn’t know what he is buying; and the seller doesn’t know why the
customer buys the product. The two parties will benefit from overcoming the
information asymmetry or to introduce techniques to overcome (or sharing) the
risk caused by information asymmetry.
The paper addresses the issue of quantifying information asymmetry, as first
step in making rational decisions about sharing this risk.
The natural technique used to share the risk is warranty. In the last twenty
years there are a great number of researches investigating the properties of differ-
ent warranty models, based on reliability of the products (see [1], [5], [8]). Also,
there are a significant advancement in theory and practice of reliability evalua-
tion (see for example [2], [4], [7]). Some considerations about the information
approach in risk analysis as a part or equivalent of product’s value are shared in
[3] and [7].
The two hot notions “Customers’ Satisfaction” and “Customer Related Manage-
ment” are too general concepts. Warranty statements, oriented to cover the risk
of information asymmetry is just one of the techniques used to achieve them.
Quantifying of that risk is what we are going to do.
The practice used warranty statements like “If you are not fully satisfied –
money back”, which addresses the risk caused by the failures in communication
between two parties. But there are no research publications, or at least the
authors had not seen any, addressing this issue – offering and investigating the
properties of models to quantify the risk caused by information asymmetry, which
may contribute to define warranty statements of that kind on a rational basis.
2. Description of the problem: a typical case
To illustrate the problem and the adopted approach to quantify information asym-
metry, let us consider the case of selling personal computers.
Information usually provided by the Seller is as follows:
Pentium IV/1.6C GHz
Intel 440 - LX Power Pro ATX
256MB DDR RAM
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1.44 MB FDD
30GB HDD QUANTUM
16MB SGRAM VGA card AGP
15” Color HANSOL 0.28, LR
N.I. (1024x768), CPU CONTROL
Information the Buyer normally looks for is something to allow him/her to:
• develop and edit text
• make even sophisticated computations
• use of e-mail
• easy access to Internet
• organize a personal data
• play games
• watch movies.
Additionally the Seller provides warranty information to share the risk among
all customers. The two types of warranty statements address different sources of
the risk.
In case of classical warranty statement, which says something like “Three
years replacement warranty if the PC or any of its part fails!” and addresses the
risk caused by low reliability of the hardware, the Buyer making his/her purchase
decision has to find answers to the following questions:
What means ATX, AGP, etc.?
Whether the offered system can fit to my needs (software)?
Whether I need all and every of the listed components?
In case warranty statement is presented in the form “Three months probation
period. Money-back if you are not fully satisfied”, it addresses the risk of mis-
communication, misunderstanding, misinforming between two parties. In that
case the Buyer has simpler task to make his/her decision: “Why not to try!
There is no risk that I will hold an unusable monument for three or more years”.
This kind of warranty statements also promotes purchasing.
The two warranty statements address two different sources of the risk:
1. Risk of malfunctioning: the product does not meet the specified (promised
by the producer/seller) properties, during the specified period of its life.
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2. Risk of misinforming (information asymmetry): the product does not
meet the expectations of the buyer (as s/he understands the promises).
Warranty statement reduces the risk to both parties, but it is offer
by the Seller.
Buyers, who have to make purchase decision, benefits in different way by
the two types of warranties:
• Malfunctioning. The seller will cover some negative effects of low quality,
and the buyer risk is limited to some inconvenience. Additionally it has
also informative role – high level of warranty means low probability for
malfunctioning and consequently low probability for such inconvenience.
• Misinforming. Second type of warranty reduces the risk of dissatisfaction,
based on misunderstanding and uncertainty, and encourages buyer to buy.
Sellers, has to distribute fairly the risk among all customers, preserving
profitability. His/her major need is to quantify as precise as possible these risks:
• Malfunctioning. Unperfected production is entirely internal problem for
the producer (seller). Precise evaluation of that risk is entirely under control
of the producer. The seller’s risk is in the difference between the real and the
expected quality. Both overestimation and underestimation are negative –
if the real quality is higher – the warranty statement is weaker (the message
to the market is weaker), otherwise – the seller’s profit will be lower, caused
by more than expected expenses for satisfying claims.
• Misinforming. The risk of unperfected communication between seller and
buyer is a property of the seller-buyer communication system and the rela-
tionship between its elements. Precise evaluation of this risk is not entirely
under control of seller. It requires comprehensive study of customers’ under-
standing, his/her assumptions, and biases. In general, the way customers
interpret the sellers’ messages.
The producer (seller) may assess with high precision the risk of malfunctioning
applying well-known techniques. But how to assess the risk caused by
misinforming?
3. Assessment the risk caused by Information Asymmetry
A simple experiment to illustrate the proposed approach to quantify the risk of
misunderstanding was carried out.
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3.1. Description of the experiment
Target group: a group of sixty students (35 responded) were offered to purchase
a PC. We assumed that these students have an established understanding about
what they need. The data were collected in the fall semester of the year 2002.
The sample could not be considered representative for some more or less signif-
icant population. Despite that, we will able to illustrate our suggestions and
conclusions.
The message: We approached the target group with an offer for a PC, with
powerful computational capabilities, designed to serve professional scientists, but
without any communication devices, with very simple sound, and no color graph-
ics:
ASUS A7V333/RA sA, VIA KT333,266,ATA 133,RAID, 3DDR,AGP 4x, USB
2.0, IEEE 1394, ATX
AMD XP PALOMINO 2100PR/1.75 GHz
DDRAM 512 MB DDR, PC 333MHz, SAMSUNG
80 GB MAXSTOR / 7200 / ATA 133/2MB
PCI ATI 1MB
17” SAMSUNG 753S 1280x1024/65Hz 1024x768/85 Hz BW
keyboard, mouse, midi tower case
The offered PC is designed to allow word processing and complex computation,
but not use of Internet and e-mails, do not allow multimedia as playing 3D games,
watch movies, etc. The price was realistic, but highly attractive.
The survey:
1. Students were asked to evaluate whether the given PC satisfies their needs,
according to the following list of applications:
• word processing,
• complex computations,
• management of personal data,
• Internet,
• e-mail,
• games,
• music, and
• movies.
Students have to specify two parameters for every item of that list: whether
they need the given application and whether the given PC allows to such
application to be used.
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2. They were offered warranty statement “Three years warranty” and were
asked to make purchase decision (yes/no).
3. They were offered three months probation warranty, and again they
were asked to make purchase decision (yes/no).
3.2. Data: presentation and interpretation
Our proposition is to define the “Information Asymmetry” f(b, a) as the differ-
ence between objective abilities of this PC to allow use of the above eight types of
applications; and the buyer’s subjective expectation that the PC possesses these
abilities.
The Information Asymmetry depends on:
b - objective ability of the product, described by the seller in his/her message
(seller’s information), and
a - the subjective (expected) ability of the product as the buyer understand
(interpret) the message (buyer’s information).
For any of the eight properties objective (the real) abilities are either true
or not true (b is either true or false – one or zero ). Personal expectations of
realization of such ability is either true or false – again one or zero.
We are able to estimate the average of individual expectations, in the respondents
group, and interpret it as a measure of the (subjective) probability that the
product possesses that particular property
For concrete feature i the difference
f(a, b) = a∆b = b ∗ (1− a) + (1− b) ∗ a
is equal to one (or TRUE) if and only if the reality and expectations concerning
feature i have opposite values, i.e. (0,1) or (1,0). Let denote fi the average (on
the sample) asymmetry of the i-th feature. We able to interpret the quantity
fi as is the probability of misunderstanding caused by given property, or risk of
wrong decision.
The overall Information Asymmetry may be evaluated as weighted average, where
“need” ni serve as weight (we may assume that a person who is not going to use
particular property is not necessary to know what this property requires):
R = 1 
ni
∑
nifi
The ratio ni/
∑
ni may be interpreted as probability of need i and so the
overall the average Information Asymmetry as total probability or risk of misun-
derstanding.
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Application: Needs Assessed Actual Risk of
ability of the ability of the wrong
system system decision
(n) a b (f)
# % # % % %
Word Processing 33 94 27 77 100 23
Complex Computations 10 29 19 54 100 44
e-mail 35 100 25 71 0 71
Internet 35 100 25 71 0 71
Maintain Personal data 33 94 27 77 100 23
Play Games 22 63 21 60 0 60
Movies 28 80 21 60 0 60
Music 35 100 20 57 0 57
Risk of misunderstanding: 51.33
Table 1: Aggregated data
For every of the eight properties, every respondent answer yes or no (checked
a box) to the two questions: “I will use” this property (need), and “The above
computer system is capable to do” this property. The form to collect data is
presented in the Appendix 1. In Table 1 the aggregated data are presented.
The properties “use of e-mail” and “use of Internet” received equal responses
and we may combine them in the further analysis.
We had given the following names of the seven variables: word, comp, inet,
pers, game, move, music.
For every respondent we had defined the needs as the number of expressed
needed properties and what share of these needs will be satisfied. Further we
counted the positive (err+) and negative (err−) errors according to whether the
respondent had assessed correctly the PC capability.
3.3. Analysis of customers’ behaviour
To analyze further the structure of the group of respondents; from point of view
of their behaviour, a cluster analysis was performed. Two clusters were distin-
guished. We named them “optimists” and “pessimists”. (In the presented figures
the optimists are dashed).
The two clusters were outlined according to the four integrated variables:
needs, satisfied needs, positive error, negative error. Variables represent the
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Figure 1: Plot of Means
Type of warranty Yes No
Replacement if it fails in three years 29 6
Money back if you are not fully satisfied 26 9
for a three months trial period
Table 2: Purchase decisions
number of respective answers. The group of pessimists consists of 19 students,
and the optimists are 16. The optimists have higher needs, higher expectations
and higher positive errors, the pessimists have higher negative errors.
The risk caused by Information Asymmetry differs significantly for the two
groups:
• The whole group – 51%;
• The pessimists – 36%;
• The optimists – 60%.
3.4. Impact of warranty statements
In Table 2 are shown results of the next part of the survey: purchase decision
according to the type of warranty.
These data shows that the group of respondents do not clearly understand
the possible problems caused by Information Asymmetry.
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4. Conclusion
A simple approach to quantify the Information Asymmetry in the case of making
purchase decisions was proposed and illustrated.
An experiment was designed and performed to highlight:
1. How and whether customers evaluate risk caused by Information Asymme-
try?
2. How the seller may assess the risk caused by Information Asymmetry?
3. What is the role of warranty statement in reducing this risk?
The experiment shows that:
1. the risk caused by Information Asymmetry could be high enough and it is
worthy to be studied more systematically;
2. it may be expected that significant percentage of customers do not under-
stand the risk of misinforming;
3. warranty statements are instruments for sharing the risk, but also allow
receiving feedback about sensitivity of the customers toward this risk.
Growing customers’ requirements in market globalization force producers/
sellers to pay special attention and to develop and apply techniques for evalu-
ation and sharing the risk of misunderstanding as this was done for the risk of
malfunctioning. There is urgent need for development and investigate the prop-
erties of variety of models serving to assess and quantify the risk of information
asymmetry. This is especially important for complex devices, which needed spe-
cial knowledge for their usage.
5. Appendix
Purchasing a PC
Consider the following offer of a PC with highly attractive price:
ASUS A7V333/RA sA, VIA KT333,266,ATA 133,RAID, 3DDR,AGP 4x, USB
2.0, IEEE 1394, ATX
AMD XP PALOMINO 2100PR/3.75 GHz
DDRAM 512 MB DDR, PC 333MHz, SAMSUNG
80 GB MAXTOR / 7200 / ATA 133/2MB
PCI ATI 1MB
17” SAMSUNG 753S 1280x1024/65Hz 1024x768/85 Hz BW
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keyboard, mouse, midi tower case
What kind of applications you will use?
Application: I will use The above computer system is capable to do
Word Processing
Complex Computations
e-mail
Internet
Maintain Personal data
Play Games
Movies
Music
(Mark with
√
)
Warranty statement 1:
Replacement if it fails in three years
I will purchase this PC! Yes No
Warranty statement 2:
Money back if you are not fully satisfied
for a three months trial period
I will purchase this PC! Yes No
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